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Abstract
This document describes the efforts to reform the Health Management Information System
(HMIS) of Tajikistan. The authors were involved in proposing and piloting a computerized
HMIS, based on a complete overhaul of the current data collection tools. This proposal was
based on experiences from a global HMIS project (called Health Information System
Programme, or HISP), and advocated supporting local decision making by employing a
flexible, decentralized system to collect, process, and analyze essential primary health care
data. Having been a Soviet Republic for 70 years, the institutional logics underlying the
current HMIS in Tajikistan were heavily influenced by the tenets of central planning, quite
alien to the ideas proposed. This paper explores the institutional logics of what existed and
what we proposed, and the interplay between them over the course of the project. The
implications of this interplay on deinstitutionalization as an implementation strategy is
sobering; first, it is clear that a complete deinstituionalization, amounting to a paradigm shift,
is necessary to overcome the differences in institutional logics, but at the same time this
account shows how achieving this can be a remarkable challenge in a context of strong,
centralized control. This study makes some interesting contributions to the field of IS. It
introduces a study from a country which until now has been almost invisible to the IS
community, in contributes to the debate about bottom up and top down implementation, and
provides a conceptual framework of institutional logics, their interplay and implications for
deinstitutionalization.
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1 Introduction
Tajikistan  is  a  Central  Asian  country  about  which  the  mainstream Information  Systems  (IS)  and  development 
communities have not seen anything published. Gaining independence after the downfall of the Soviet Union in 
1991,  the  country  has  experienced  an  extremely  rocky  period,  with  a  prolonged  civil  war  and  the  loss  of  the 
supporting  Soviet  financial  and  social  infrastructure.  Unlike  some  of  the  other  Central  Asian  countries,  like 
Kasakhstan and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan has no oil or gas resources, and is thus not a focus of attention of either the 
Western nor the Russian economic decision makers. Further challenges that the country face includes an extreme 
climate, a long and porous border with the war-ravaged Afghanistan,  a recent food and energy crisis which had 
huminatarian proportions (Antelava 2008), and the exodus of many trained people because of weak employment  and 
social opportunities at home.
As in many of the other Central Asian countries, there are urgent public health problems facing the country. The 
demise of the Soviet economic base, followed by civil war, has led to a surge in various communicable diseases in 
the last two decades. According to the World Health Organization, life expectancy has decreased owing to poor 
nutrition, polluted water, and increased incidence of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, cholera,  and 
other cardiovascular diseases (WHO 2008).  
In this context, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) provide interesting opportunities in the fight 
against these problems. For example, official statistics in 2003 quote infant mortality as low as 13.5 per 1000 live 
births.  But since this figure does not include information about children born at home (as per UNICEF constituting 
about 38% of the total), estimates in rural areas report a figure of nearly 109 per 1000 live births (WHO 2008). In 
this context, ICTs can play a significant role in identifying the extent of births not being reported, their locations, and 
surrounding public health determinants of child death. Without suggesting that ICTs can solve the problem of child 
deaths, we argue that by providing systematic information about the identified parameters, the problem can be made 
visible to the decision makers, which can help more focused interventions being taken up. Without proper visibility, 
the problem to a large extent becomes “black-boxed” and often swept under the carpet, and not lending itself to 
problem-redressal actions.
Acknowledging the key role that ICTs can play in public health management, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
has established an organization called the Health Sector Reform Project (HSRP) in 2005 with the aim of creating 
various  reform  initiatives,  including  relating  to  Health  Management  Information  Systems  (HMIS).  One  of  the 
authors of this paper had been invited by the ADB to participate in the HMIS related reform efforts, and he further 
enrolled  the  three  other  authors  of  the  paper  (Doctoral  students)  to  create  a  joint  team.  This  team  then  was 
responsible for the design, development, and pilot implementation of the national HMIS. However,  carrying out 
these tasks was fraught with immense challenges, largely related to countering the existing institutions left behind by 
the Soviet legacy which favored a large manual system based on a centralized planning model. Understanding and 
addressing these historical  conditions and trying to create  new institutions based on a computer based HIS and 
favoring local analysis and use of information, was a key effort of the research team. This effort translated into the 
following two key research questions: 
What are the key institutions that challenge the introduction of ICT-based HMIS reforms in the context of a post-
soviet economy?
Developing theoretical concepts inspired by institutional theory to understand the nature of these challenges and how 
these may be addressed.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  propose  key  theoretical  concepts  from 
institutional theory that helps to develop our analysis. After providing a brief summary of the research methods used 
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in section 3, the details of the case study are provided in section 4. The case analysis based on institutional theory is  
presented in section 4, which is followed by the concluding section on discussions and contributions.
2 Theoretical perspective: Institutional Logics and De-
institutionalisation
The theoretical aim of the paper is to develop concepts that can help to identify existing  institutions that shape the 
deployment of computer based HMIS and their associated processes. This can be seen to involve the creation and 
spreading of new institutions. So, what becomes important for us is to understand what are the institutional logics in 
play, what are the new logics being introduced, their interplay, and how these lead to specific outcomes with respect 
to the efforts to introduce change, conceptualized as deinstitutionalization.
Theoretically, institutional logics can be seen to represent 'sets of "material" practices and symbolic constructions 
which constitute a field's organising principles and which are available to organisations and individuals to elaborate' 
(Friedland  and  Alford  1991).  These  logics  represent  cognitive  maps  inscribing  the  belief  systems  carried  by 
participants in the field to guide and give meaning to their activities (Scott et al. 2000).  Institutional logics inscribe 
the ‘organizing principles’ that supply practice guidelines to field participants (Friedland and Alford 1991) and tap in 
to  both  the  cultural-cognitive  and  normative  dimensions  of  an  institutional  environment  (Scott  et  al.  2000). 
Institutional  actors,  then, can be viewed as agent  and carriers  for producing and reproducing the logic within a 
specific institutional environment (ibid.). 
Institutional logics are never homogeneous, and within an organization multiple logics may be simultaneously in 
play leading to the construction of institutional contradictions (Friedland and Alford 1991). For example,  in the 
context of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) use in the forestry sector in India, (Sahay and Walsham 1999) 
elaborate  on two sets  of  logic  in  play.  The  first  concerns  the  logic  of  how foresters  make decisions  on forest 
management  based largely on political  and social  considerations such as the minister  wanting to take up water 
conservation activities in his political constituency. The second concerns the contradictory logic inscribed in the GIS 
which is based on making such decisions (of locating forestry interventions) based on scientific modelling enabled 
through the  GIS.  The interplay of  these  two logics,  Sahay and Walsham point  out,  contribute  to  the  less  than 
effective uptake of the GIS in the forest department. 
Negotiating  and  reconciling  conflicting  institutional  logics  may  contribute  to  the   deinstitutionalization  of  the 
existing logic and re-institutionalization of the new (Jepperson 1991). Deinstitutionalization is “a process by which 
institutions weaken  and disappear”  (Scott  2001),  and “takes  place when established meanings  and action in an 
organization are discredited, either as a result of competing meanings and actions or  because they are seen as failing 
to contribute to the institutional raison d`être” (Avgerou 2002). Further, Oliver describes deinstitutionalization as 
follows:
“the  process  by  which  the  legitimacy  of  an  established  or  institutionalized  organizational  practice  erodes  or 
discontinues. Specifically, deinstitutionalization refers to the delegitimation of an established organizational practice 
or  procedure  as  a  result  of  organizational  challenges  to  or  the failure  of  organizations  to  reproduce  previously 
legitimated or taken-for-granted organizational actions” (Oliver 1992)
Oliver points out three key factors that contribute to deinstitutionalization: political, functional and social.  Political 
pressures may evolve under threat of erosion or displacement as new and emerging practices may challenge the 
utility and legitimacy of existing ones.  Functional presssures relate to technical or functional considerations that 
may compromise or  raise  doubts  about  the  instrumental  value  of  an  institutionalized  practice.  Social  pressures 
include  increasing  normative  fragmentation  within  an  organization  as  a  by-product  of  other  changes  such  as 
increasing  workforce  diversity  or  addressing  the  problem  of  high  turnover.  There  can  be  disruptions  to  an 
organization’s historical continuity (such as mergers) or changes in state laws that can prohibit or discourage the 
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perpetuation  of  an  institutional  practice  and  its  associated  deinstitutionalization.  Apart  from intentional  change 
processes,  there  can  be  unanticipated  or  unintentional  consequences  of  purposive  activities  leading  to  new 
institutions. For example, Hwang and Powell describe the 1986 Tax Reform Act to have unintended consequences of 
helping the creation of a new institutional arrangement in the form of a new industry of low income housing (Hwang 
and Powell 2005).
In  summary,  the  focus  of  our  theoretical  analysis  is  to  firstly  understand  what  are  the  existing  and  proposed 
institutional logics surrounding the introduction of computer based health information systems in Tajikistan. The 
concept of deinstitutionalization further helps us to theoretically understand the interplay between different logics, 
why certain logics stay, why others erode away, and what social, political and functional pressures contribute to this.
3 Research Methods
Research approach
A useful method to develop and implement HMIS in developing countries suggested by Braa et al. is that of action 
research based on the principles of "networks of action" (Braa et al. 2004) They build this argument within the 
context of a global interaction called HISP (Health Information System Programme), which involves among other 
things the design, development, and implementation of a free and open source software called the District Health 
Information  Software  (DHIS)  .  Taking  their  point  of  departure  of  trying  to  address  the  commonly  perceived 
problems of  lack of  sustainability  and scalability of HMIS in developing countries,  they draw upon Elden and 
Chisholm to argue  for  the  need  to  carry  out  action  research  in  networks  rather  than singular  units  (Elden  and 
Chisholm 1993). Such an approach, they argue, provides the potential for multiple sites to learn with each other, 
share experiences and knowledge, and to plan and implement action in a context specific manner.
   
With this background, our action research approach approached the question of network building at two levels: 
1.  Global  level:  to  examine  how the  global  HISP  network  could  be leveraged  upon to  support  the  process  of 
adaptation to the local context of Tajikistan, and mutually, how the global network could learn from the Tajikistan 
experience.
 2. Local level: Within Tajikistan, to understand what kind of socio-political, technical and health related networks 
could be mobilized in order to support our overall project aims of HIS related reforms.
 
The specific interventions that we carried out with respect to building these networks of action at the two identified 
levels are summarized in table 1 below.
Data collection methods       
Data was collected through various means. In the very beginning of the project, an orientation was developed of the 
historical conditions around the HMIS, such as the prior involvement of experts and the ongoing efforts. This was 
done through the study of prior consultant  reports, the study of existing reporting formats, and through detailed 
formal and informal discussions with the HSRP HMIS consultant.
In the initial situation analysis phase, seven key national level program managers were interviewed, as well as one IT 
expert in the MedStat program (the HMIS software currently in use), the head of the Ministry of Health task force on 
HMIS, and a World Bank representative who was currently involved with a (failed) HMIS reform project related to 
the computerization of primary records. In these interviews, basically the effort was to try and understand from the 
respondents  their  existing  information  needs,  how that  was  being  met  (or  not)  from the  existing  HMIS,  their 
aspirations about computerization, and their suggestions on how this could be materialized. Each of the interviews 
lasted  about  an  hour  and  a  half,  during  which  notes  were  taken,  later  to  be  written  up  in  more  detail  and 
supplemented with comments on personal opinions. All interviews were conducted in Russian, which was enabled 
through a translator supplied to the authors from HSRP. The translator (from Uzbekistan), though not professionally 
trained as a translator, was fluent in English and Russian and to the extent possible managed to enable a relatively 
smooth  flow  of  conversation.   Although  Tajikistan  has  several  languages,  of  which  Tajik  is  currently  almost 
universally spoken except in the mountain regions, most of the current doctors had received training under the Soviet 
system, and tended to use Russian as the professional language. The interviews in the district were conducted in 
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Tajik, for which we had no official translator. These interviews were considerably shorter and harder to conduct due 
to the language obstacles, although we were accompanied by a native Tajik-speaker with moderate English skills. In 
the absence of effective verbal conversation, a lot of interpretation was made based on the facial and other gestures 
of the people, for example their sense of excitement (or not) when they first saw the HMIS application. 
Table 1 Intervetions and relation to Networks of Action
Action interventions carried 
out in Tajikistan




Document study, interviews, 
presentations, discussions
• Adopt best practises from global 
experience to the specific needs 
of Tajikistan
• Gain experience from Central 
Asian primary health care 
practices
• Enroll interests in HMIS reform 
process
• Establish local network covering the 
fields of health and IT
• Build awareness of HMIS challenges 
and ways to address them
Software development:
Expand functionality, 
database design, application 
translation, report generation, 
creating validation rules
• Adapt Global DHIS to the 
Tajikistan context
• Advance DHIS with new 
functionalities developed in 
response to Tajikistan 
requirements
• Enrol Tajik competence in global 
DHIS development
• Establish a software development 
node in Tajikistan which could 
potentially serve as a hub in the 
future for Central Asia
• Develop a local team, committed to 
Free and Open Source Software 
Development
• Develop feedback mechanisms 
between  users of DHIS in the 
district and the developers
• Build capacity of local team to 
support HSRP and also the 
community of users
Capacity building:
Training sessions and follow-
up activities in district and 
national level
• Adapt training material and 
practises from other settings to 
Tajikistan
• Contribute to global repository of 
training material and examples 
from Tajikistan
• Create training material in 
Russian which could be made 
available to other Russian 
speaking nations
• Formalize training procedures and 
content for health information 
officers
• Develop training capacity at national 
and district level
• Conduct orientation training to help 
create greater buy in and support
Another set of ongoing conversations, face to face and over the email, was carried out with our ADB partners, the 
head who was in Manila,  and the local  representative  based in Dushanbe.  Since they were both fluent  English 
speakers, when present in interviews, they also helped in making translations, and for us to understand more richly 
the historical and political context in which a particular respondent’s comments could be interpreted.
Three workshops were held. The first, with around 40 participants from the various national level health programs, 
statistical  bureau,  and HSRP staff,  served as the forum for the official  software launch and training,  as well as 
discussions on broader HMIS related policy issues. The second workshop was intended for province-level staff from 
the five pilot regions of HSRP, but due to winter setting in, roads were closed and only staff from two regions could 
come. It  was decided to move it to a smaller locale, where also a reliable power-supply could be secured. These 
experiences helped to understand the perils of travel and computer use in the bitter cold and adverse road conditions 
in rural Tajikistan. The third workshop successfully hosted 10 people in Kulyab, the pilot district, in a Central Asian 
Development Bank “e-mail center”. However, this training was frequently interrupted due to power fluctuations, and 
5
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-11
was cut short due to immense cold and the lack of indoor heating. Such experiences helped us to gain a richer 
context based understanding of the situation, and how this could shape HMIS implementation efforts.
Four presentations were given, to the MoH, ADB, donor partners, and a closing presentation. Feedback on these 
presentations as well as in the workshops was very useful as a data source. For example, in the closing presentation, 
where  the  proposed  recommended  measures  were  outlined,  the  director  of  MedStat  (the  HMIS  division  of  the 
Ministry of Health) gave his account of the current challenges and strategies in a response to the proposed changes.
System development and prototyping, including feedback from the training sessions and workshops, was further 
used  to  gather  data  on  HMIS  requirements.  It  was  done  in  collaboration  with  a  local  Internet  policy  agency, 
promoting the use of Open Source Software in Tajikistan. The local agency were very helpful in giving us tips on 
what to expect from the government, understand the status and capacity around free software in the country, and also 
to create networks with other locally based actors such as the UNICEF.
In addition, numerous informal discussions and conversations were conducted throughout the involvement, both in 
the capital, in the pilot province and district. Especially relevant to note is the various discussions we had with the 
HSRP HMIS consultant who helped us to adapt both socially and in the office, to understand to some extent the 
Tajik and MOH culture, and provide us with interesting historical insights into the earlier HMIS efforts in Tajikistan. 
The following two tables summarize the data collection methods applied
Table 2 Overview of data collection methods
Type Nature and volume When




Presentations 4, for ADB, MOH, donor partners, and closing 
presentation for HSRP, MedStat, and MOH
Situation analysis and end 
of project
Workshops Training and discussions, 1 for national level 
participants, 1 for Province and district level, and 1 
in pilot district for district health programs
Launch of Version 1: 
Tajikistan HMIS and Pilot 
project
Document study Previous projects reports, Current reporting forms Situation analysis
Informal discussions Numerous with HMIS consultant, HSRP staff, local 
software developers
Daily
Participant observations Use of MedStat software at national and district 
level. Study of information flows and practices 
around recording of data, use of registers etc.
Regularly
Data collection through 
emails
E-mails with HMIS consultant, software team, 
amongst ourselves
Continuous and ongoing
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Table 3 Interviews conducted
Institution Respondents Types of issues raised Time
Different national 
health programs
Deputy director or director 
level
Current system and its challenges, 





District or central district 
hospital program directors
Information flow, use of 
information, reporting routines
30-45 minutes
International NGO Country representative and 
HMIS representative
Past experiences of HMIS 





Director and staff Technical and infrastructural 




Our  analysis  was  broadly  framed  within  an  interpretive  tradition  based  on  trying  to  understand  the  subjective 
interpretations of our respondents and how inter-subjective meanings were constructed. For example, we could see 
that the MedStat division to some extent saw us as trying to encroach into their turf, and thus tried to emphasize the 
advantages of the MedStat software over DHIS. The HSRP actors on the other hand, needed to show their efforts to 
be a success and thus were our spokespersons to the Ministry. The local internet agency, being strong proponents of 
open source, saw us as agents for highlighting and strengthening the open source movement in Tajikistan. Through 
these various conversations, we tried to understand what were the different institutional logics in play, and which of 
them were dominant. 
After the conclusion of the on-site involvement in Tajikistan, the authors got together in Oslo and discussed the 
overall  empirical  experience  in  order  to  understand  what  were  the  dominant  analytical  themes  that  we  could 
individually discern.  We all in different words expressed how deep the contradiction was between what we were 
trying to do and the institutional conditions that existed in the country. This brought us to agree that the concept of 
“institutional logics” and their interplay would serve as a useful lens to analyse the data. This then helped to point us 
towards institutional theory, especially within the realm of neo-institutionalism, specifically to develop conceptual 
ideas around institutional logics. Since our focus was on bringing change and in the process breaking down existing 
ways of doing things, we found the idea of deinstitutionalization to be relevant to our analysis. 
4 Case study
The project was initiated through an invitation of a University of Oslo professor by the ADB to work with HSRP on 
the design,  development and implementation of  a  computer  based HMIS in Tajikistan.  Early indications of  the 
bureaucratic institutions that we would need to confront came in the process of acquiring a visa to enter the country. 
In short, a letter of request for visa had to be made by the inviting department (in our case, a letter from the Vice  
Prime Minister) to the Foreign Ministry who would then send a letter to the professor, that needed to be presented to 
the authorities at the airport who would stamp the passport and allow entry. Further, this letter would only be given 
for a duration of one month, single entry, and for further stay the process needed to be repeated. As things turned out, 
the professor needed to leave the country in the middle for a few days given some family exigencies in India. This 
created a lot of administrative hurdles in which special permission was even needed to leave the country, in which 
the intervention also of the Indian ambassador in Tajikistan had to be called upon to obtain necessary permissions 
and visas. 
The project was carried out in an intensive period of about 3 months from November 2007 till early February 2008. 
Broadly,  the project components involved an initial situation analysis and identification of local technical partner 
(from middle November for a month), followed by a month (till about January 22) of systems development and the 
pilot testing of the first prototype (called Version 1: Tajikistan HMIS), and then followed by 2 weeks of initiating 
pilot testing in one district (Kulyab). Since our case analysis involved the study of the interplay between the existing 
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institutional logic and that inscribed in the HMIS intervention efforts, the case narrative is structured in two sections: 
Existing situation: Institutional  logics at play;  HMIS intervention:  Proposed institutional logics.  In  the following 
analysis section, the interplay of the two sets of logics is described, specifically with respect to their implications on 
deinstitutionalization.
Existing situation: Institutional logics at play:  
The HMIS consultant at the HSRP office was the point of contact to understand what have been the historical issues 
plaguing the HMIS, what have been previous attempts towards HMIS reform, and who were the key stakeholders at 
the  national  level  with respect  to  the  HMIS.  These  included  officials  at  the  rank  of  Deputy/Director  from the 
divisions of Medical Statistics Information Center (MedStat), Immunization, TB, Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Center for 
Epidemiology,  Struggle  against  Tropical  diseases,  officials  from  the  Ministry  of  Health  (Task  Group  and  IT 
Specialist), and representatives from the World Bank.
It was evident that the basis of the existing HMIS was a historical product of the Soviet health system. The central 
control of the HMIS was under the Medical Statistics division (called MedStat), and true to its name reflected its 
focus on treating the HMIS as a annual statistics generating tool. The MedStat division had an out of date software 
(also called MedStat) built upon a FoxPro platform which basically was capable of entering data on the existing 37 
reporting forms by the facilities and generating the aggregated reports by rayons, oblasts1 and nationally. From the 
37 reporting forms, 2 were based monthly and rest annually. MedStat was not capable of generating any indicators, 
and  for  this  purpose  the  required  data  was  fed  in  separately  in  a  WHO  created  program  called  DPS  (Data 
Presentation System) and the generated indicators were uploaded into a national website. In addition to these above 
two softwares, there was another program called Factor which obtained normally by phone, data from the oblasts on 
5 variables related to maternal health, and separate reports were generated. Electronically, the three programs did not 
“speak to each other;” despite being all under the control of the MedStat division, and the IT specialist told us that 
there were no further plans to upgrade the MedStat software.
However, there had been over the years some adhoc interventions by different specialists on varying aspects of the 
HMIS. For example, we were told that the World Bank had been involved in the computerization of the primary 
records, and another specialist from the West had come and suggested the use of the full blown ICD 10 system for 
the recording of various diseases.  HSRP themselves had been involved in the redesign of some of the 37 reporting 
forms and making English translations and guidelines for use on some of them.
Going below the level of 37 forms, there were 367 recording forms that were used at the primary health facilities to 
record the basic services provided.  The link between the recording and reporting forms was not at all clear, where 
extensive data was firstly collected in the recording forms, a significant proportion of it was not included in the 
reporting forms, and in fact further additional data was added on. The 37 reporting forms corresponded to different 
health programs (such as TB, Malaria, Infectious diseases) with a great deal of overlap and redundancies.  At the 
rayon level, the different health programs put their respective data on the MedStat forms, which were then sent to the 
corresponding oblast health program, and also to the Statistical Department at the Central Rayon Hospital. Further, 
there were parallel reporting system in place with both the health programs and the MedStat department sending the 
same information to their corresponding superior level.  In some cases (like the immunization program from oblast to 
the national  level),  the data was entered into a  computer (say EpiInfo  or Excel) and sent  to the national  level. 
However,  since  the  EpiInfo  data  was  seen  to  be  incompatible  with  the  MedStat  program,  the  national  level 
immunization person would take the data from the computer, put it onto paper, send that to the MedStat division who 
would then electronically enter the data into the MedStat program.  A TB program manager described this process:
1 Rayon and Oblast are the Tajikistan equivalents of District (typically 50.000 to 100.000 
inhabitants), and Province (10-15 districts) respectively
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Also, we have 16 computer specialists, but only in Kulyab and Dushanbe. But the problem is we cannot use 
the data from Kulyab and Dushanbe which is entered in Epi Info, because we have to adapt the data to be  
entered in MOH formats. So, to MedStat, we only send data on written form…this is a structure which is  
more than 75 years old.
Further, poor IT resources in particular health divisions further impeded the use of computerized data, as informed to 
us by a Deputy Director of the national TB programme:
We want to include all data in Tajikstan, but some is always missed. Now we need one IT specialist and  
train him full time to work on Epi Info.  How we reach the 66 centers, when we have no budget, no travel  
money, no nothing.
Further impediments to the use of computers concerned the availability and permission to use paper.  We were told 
paper was not regularly provided, and the limited budgets did not allow local purchase of this. For instance,  in 
Kulyab district, we were told that the yearly budget for gasoline would be spent in just a couple of weeks of normal 
activity, so the purchase of paper did not assume high priority. A Tajik representative in the World Bank summed up 
this issue as follows:
Salary of doctors is so low – it is a privilege for the country that they are even working for us at those  
salaries. In this condition of poverty, it is unnatural to expect them to spend their own money on purchasing  
paper.
Given the paradoxical  situation where paper was not  available,  and that every month reports needed to be sent 
involving literally hundreds of pages, we were told that “inventive” local solutions were found to fulfil the routine 
reporting  requirements.  A senior  official  of  a  donor agency  narrated  to  us  his  experience  of  how reports  were 
constructed at the local level: 
When asked how the reports were prepared, he (a doctor at the Rayon level) said he will tell (about how  
reports were prepared) if his name is not quoted. He said, he bought one chocolate to the room of the  
specialist responsible for the data. The Specialist generated the report for the whole district. We (the aid 
agency official) told [the director of MedStat] that this is the cost of your reporting system – one bar of  
chocolate. 
While on the face of it, the information flows may have seemed “irrational,” it could be seen to inscribe the deep 
rooted hierarchical authority structures and centralization. For example, we found that the mother health program at 
the Oblast level first sent their data in the their MedStat forms to their superior level at the national level, who would 
then approve it and send back to the originating source at the Oblast. This person would then send the approved data 
horizontally in the same MedStat forms to the oblast MedStat centre, who would then send the data to the national 
level MedStat centre.
Given the huge size of the data to be reported upon (about 30,000 data elements) on a routine basis, the extremely 
poor HMIS related resources, and that reporting was seen as an irrelevant exercise, data quality was an obvious 
victim. The head of the HMIS task force at the MOH admitted that the use of the ICD 10 codes for classification was 
fraught with errors, and he estimated that 35% of the data in this system would be incorrect from classification errors 
itself. In a modification of Winston Churchill’s famous expression on statistics, a senior official of the Republican 
Center for Immunology commenting on the quality of the immunization data said:   
I believe, the first lie is statistics, second lie is statistics and the third lie is statistics.
The reporting forms were clearly poorly designed and were comprised of multiple sub forms. To give an example, 
we found  one form (No 30) titled “Treatment Prophylactic Activity of Facility” to contain about 50 sub forms, 
9
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-11
covering 1836 data elements, and spanning about 75 pages. To deal with this “gigantomania” of forms, sub-forms 
and data elements, we found that many health programs had created intermediate forms, designed locally for their 
local  use,  while still  keeping up the facade  of complying with the MedStat  reporting forms.   For  example,  the 
National immunization program manager said that while they sent the MedStat form, they have another form for 
immunization (which was one page long) that they used for their internal purposes. In another example, we were 
shown how a list of 350 items fulfilled the information needs to run a central district hospital. To comply with the 
official system, this information was entered into their corresponding MedStat forms, representing only 2.5% of the 
total  cells  there.  A further  example  was  provided  by  the  Infectious  diseases  department  at  the  central  district 
department which they called an “emergency form.”  In this form (see picture below), 8 essential diseases were listed 
(and spaces left for others), and were reported by the different rural health centres (shown as columns). This form 
was used for local purposes in addition to the standardized recording and reporting forms (prepared for national 
reporting).
Figure 1 Emergency form on infectious diseases
Summary of the existing institutional logics that we identified include:
• Central planning for statistics management (supporting curative rather than preventive health).
• HMIS as annual statistics generating tool.
• “Gigantomania”, collection of extensive data signals seriousness and scientific vigour.
• Computers can be employed to automate paper-based systems.
HMIS intervention: Proposed institutional logics 
The proposed HMIS was customized by a team of Doctoral students using the shell of a free and open source HMIS 
application designed and developed under the HISP network involving developers in Oslo and other HISP nodes 
(such as India and Ethiopia). A first step in the design process was the creation of “data sets” and the corresponding 
“data elements.” We carried out a mapping exercise in which we first detailed out all the forms, the sub forms and 
the data elements contained in these different groups. We then suggested that instead of thinking of forms, we must 
consider relevant health related categories, and map the data into these categories. Further, we suggested that there 
should be two broad categories of routine data (reported once a month) and semi-permanent data (reported annually). 
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We found 6 categories to cover all the routine data and 3 categories for semi-permanent data.  The Table below 
summarizes this exercise:
Table 4 Categories of data and which MedStat forms they come from
Routine 
health data
Category 1: Infectious diseases (From forms 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 7, 16.4) 
Category 2: TB (Forms 1.8, 8, 33.1, 33.2. 33.3. 33.4. 33.5. 33.6, 33.7, 45.3-45.8) 
Category 3: Mother health (Forms 5.1-5.5, 12A.1, 12A.2, 12 O, 13, 32.1- 32.6)
Category 4: Child health (Forms 2.1-2.2, 31.1-31.6, 41,3, 41.4) 
Category 5: Mental health (Forms 10, 11, 37.1, 37.2 )
Category 6: Departmental/inpatient activity: (Forms 7H.1-7H.2, 14.1- 14.3, 16.3, 20.1, 20.2, 





    Medical equipment: (Forms 30.1.1, 30.1.2, 30.1.3, 30.1.4, 30.1.6, 30.1.7,34.1, 34.2, 34.3, 44.2) 
    Clinics: (Forms 45.2, 47.3 -47.17, 47.22-47.24)
Category 2: Human resources:
     Staff: (Forms 10A.1-10A.2, 16.1, 16.2, 17A.1-17A.2, 17.1-17.3, 20.3, 30.2, 30.4.2, 39.1, 40.1, 
41.1, 41.2, 42.1, 44.1, 45.1, 71.1, 71.2) 
     Posts: (Forms 47.1, 47.2, 47.18-47.21)
Category 3: Community status: (Forms 12, 15, 35, 36.1-36.4 )
Furthermore, we suggested a radical reduction of data to be collected, and a shift to indicators (rates and ratios), 
rather than just data elements (counts). A smaller system would have positive impact on both time consumption for 
data entering and ambiguities related to correct use, and hopefully help to improve the level of data quality. Shifting 
the focus from counts to indicators, the data would assume relevance for decision making across time and space. 
However, when we presented our proposal for redesign based on data sets (and not forms), it was rejected as we 
were told that “the Central Statistics Authority has approved the existing 37 reporting formats, and we are not even 
allowed to change or add a logo to the form.” So, leave aside implementing a proposal involving a radical redesign, 
we were not even allowed to change the location of a single piece of data in the existing formats. We thus then made 
a design decision that we would take each of these reporting forms to each represent a data set, and have groups 
defined within each of them, each corresponding to a sub form. So, our design approach ended in developing a 
maximum  data  set  (rather  than  a  minimum  data  set),  and  we  rationalized  this  (rather  unpleasant  decision  of 
automating existing inefficiencies) by telling ourselves that through this approach of one-to-one automation would 
help us in the first place to get the existing data into the computer. This could then be followed up with a process of 
analysis  of existing data, making visible the poor quality of existing data to the planners,  and with this make a 
stronger  argument  for  applying  our  minimum data  set  approach  in  the  next  iteration.  But,  as  the  World  Bank 
representative told, a smaller system was not seen compatible with central  planning, and he was skeptical about 
chances of our success:
”We wanted to simplify the system, when the consultant showed the MOH a system with 15 indicators, they  
laughed, how can it meet the needs of the health system? They laughed and did not accept it. This is the  
paradox – we want a huge system, but don’t have the money. They are suspicious of small systems”
To add more observations from the process of system development, the issues of translation and control rules are 
worth mentioning. During translation, the system went through the process of customisation into two languages – 
Russian and Tajik. Technically this task went with little or no difficulty, but it did create a big confusion in the literal 
meanings and translation of medical words and disease names to Tajik. The professional language (for Medicine) 
even for the local people of Tajikistan is Russian, and for example there is not yet an ICD10 translation to Tajik. For 
a range of health conditions, there are no standard Tajik names, with a multitude of descriptions used locally in 
addition to Russian.    
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With respect to controls, the tabular forms in MedStat required many data items to be recorded twice. For each row 
item, such as Malaria, there would be columns both for age groups and gender, and also a column for the total. Data 
would then appear  twice,  both in a  specific  age-group,  and in  the total.  In  DHIS,  data items can  be set  to  be 
calculated automatically by aggregating other items, so that totals could be produced on demand. Thus, we argued, 
the need to enter them disappears, and they can be removed from the data entry screen. In the case of MedStat, where 
total-items typically constitute ten percent of all data items, it could mean the removal of 3000 items to be filled in. 
However, this was not to be implemented, as it was still in the MedStat administration’s intentions to manually enter 
totals,  and  then run checks  on them against  their  various  components.  This  had been  included in  the MedStat 
software with a set of so-called controls. These controls made sense in a paper system, where manual aggregation 
into totals could produce errors. This “paper verification logic” was applied on a one-to-one basis to a computer 
system where the possibility of manual aggregation error could be eliminated altogether. Instead of removing the 
system of manual aggregation, and go for automatically calculated totals, the development of the same set of controls 
in DHIS as in MedStat became a compulsory requirement from the MedStat team. 
Summary of the HMIS intervention related institutional logics that we identified included:
• Decentralized decision making based on routine data.
• HMIS is indicator- and action-led.
• Small, essential data sets best supports action and improves data quality.
• Computer systems should be employed to internalise routine aggregation, increase flexibility, 
and decrease response-time to changes in epidemiological information needs.
5 Analysis: Interplay of logics and implication on 
deinstitutionalization.
In the case study, we have tried to elaborate upon the institutional logics which we found to be in play through 
conducting the situation analysis of the HMIS in Tajikistan, and also the logics which we believed were inscribed in 
the HMIS related intervention that  we were  seeking to introduce.  In  this analysis  section,  we will  describe the 
interplay of these two sets of logics, and how this shaped the process of deinstitutionalization that we were seeking to 
bring about in the existing HMIS. Specifically, we discuss two sets of interplays:
1. Statistics for central planning and control versus using information for decentralized action.
2. Rigidity of paper based reporting formats versus the flexibility of electronic customizable forms.
We now elaborate on both these sets of interplays.
1 Statistics for central planning and control versus using information for 
decentralized action
The Tajikistan system is a  historical  product of a Soviet  system of governance,  and nearly 2 decades  after  the 
breadown of  the  USSR, the  deep  rooted  Soviet  institutions  can  still  seen  to  be  in  play.  In  another  context  of 
collectivization (before the Second World War), this has been described by Scott as “gigantomania,”  referring to the 
focus on trying to collect huge amounts of data as a form of centralized planning and control (Scott 1999). In the 
post-Soviet  system in  contermpary  Tajikistan,  we  still  see  strong  elements  of  this  giagantomania  in  the  health 
system. For example, the routine health system seeks to collect data on more than 30,000 data items on all kinds of 
diverse items such as soil samples, aeroplane vibrations, cigarrete smoking in addition to health programs. When this 
magnitude  of  data  collection  for  a  country  of  about  7  million  population  is  compared  with  the  Indian  system 
(catering to a population of more than a billion) which collects about 3000 items of data routinely, the sheer size of 
the system  is magnified.
Further,  the Soviet  system is acknowledged  to  pride itself  to  be based  on a strong scienctific  foundation.  This 
historical tendency is reflected in the Tajikistan’s MOH decision to use the full blown version of the ICD 10 system. 
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The implication of this was each disease was classified by various codes, and each code had various sub codes and 
sub-sub codes. For example:  Acute paralytic poliomyelitis (ICD10 A80.1-3), which was divided into “Associated 
with vaccine (A80.0)”, “Provoked by wild type virus (A80.1-2)”, and “Other and not precise (A80.3)”. Like this, 
there were literally thousands of examples.
Even though a high percentage of the codes were reported as zero, and there were huge amounts of overplaps and 
duplications, the Tajik officials prided themselves on the use of the system as it was associated with a high level of 
scientific expertise. In the Soviet era where in the central system there was a high level of scientific and technical  
experts, the data collected from the peripheral levels was subjected to a serious scientific scruitiny. However, now at 
one level the scenario had changed with the level and numbers of experts in the central system dramatically reduced 
with the fall of the Soviet Union, while at another level the same kind of practice had continued (of large amounts of 
data flowing to the central level). So, now while similar levels of detailed data was expected to be collected, there 
was a simultaneous decrease in the capacity to both collect good quality data and also the skills to analyze and use 
the data.
In contrast to this existing system, the HISP philosophy towards HMIS development can be seen to be a historical 
product of post-apartheid 1994 South Africa, a period of ANC driven reform based on an agenda that emphasized 
decentralization  and  integration  (Braa  and  Hedberg  2002).  Coming  out  of  Apartheid,  the  health  system  was 
characterized by extreme fragmentation where health care delivery was organized by colour and creed. The reform 
process then sought to integrate these disparate systems and simultaneously decentralize decision making. The HISP 
project within this context sought to develop free and open source software which could be installed at the local 
levels, and large scale capacity building programs would be carried out to empower the health workers and making 
them use “information for local action.” These principles and practices of the HISP initiative were inscribed into the 
design of the software (DHIS -which empasized local flexibility and user control), and became part of the training 
material used for processes of capacity building of the health staff. These principles, materials, artefacts (the free 
software) then started to circulate through the HISP network by various means, such as the movement of HISP staff 
across nodes, the sharing of software and of training material. This circulation also found its way to Tajikistan.
The ideology of using information for local action became a buzzword in the entire HISP network, and was tried to 
be adapted  in  various  context  with varying  degrees  of  success.  While  this was successfuly translated for  other 
provinces  in South Africa,  in countries  like Cuba where the system was centrally controlled (by Castro),  these 
principles could not be successfully adapted (Sæbø and Titlestad 2004), In countries like Mozambique where the 
capacity at the local level was weak, it was also difficult to apply these principles in local settings. Through the 
medium of the Oslo professor who was invited by Tajikistan, the existing HISP ideology, principles and artefacts 
was also introduced to Tajikistan and discussed in presentations and written reports.. For example, a key part of the 
situation study was to develop the argument that too much data was being collected, a high proportion of the data 
was blank, the data was only flowing upwards, and no use of it was being made at the local levels to help improve 
local service delivery.
However, adapting these principles of use of information for local action would involve the incorporation of a whole 
range of HISP principles, including the creation of a minimum data set, linking data being collected with indicators, 
and large scale capacity building programs of the health staff with a focus on the use of information. However, we 
soon realized that these aims were unattainable in the present scenario. Firstly, no permission could be obtained to 
make any changes, even the removal of duplicate data elements that were included in the same form. Further, the 
system we found was not mature to absorb the shock of these large scale and radical changes. Since even the basic 
information processing systems were not in place, such as for collecting quality data, it was too ambitiuous to expect 
local staff to start on the analysis of data. There were further constraints such as the poor capacity of the health staff,,  
very weak infrastructure (eg lack of power in the peripheral areas), and the extreme climatic conditions which made 
it difficult to travel to the districts to carry out the training programs. 
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The interplay of the two sets of logics thus resulted in our adapting a strategy of mainting the status quo in terms of 
their reporting forms, their numbers and design, but translating this status quo into an automated form. The reasoning 
being that by the analysis of the information inscribed in this status quo system, we could  make visible the poor 
quality and the absurdity of the current design. This we believed would help us to make a stronger case for change in 
the future, and when changes would be approved we could be able to easily adapt it to the flexible DHIS based 
HMIS application. Not the best solution, but this was the best we could construct given the circumstances and the 
limted time frames.
2 Rigidity of paper based reporting formats versus the flexibility of electronic 
customizable forms
For both institutional and technical reasons, the paper formats which were in use were inscribed with a deep sense of 
rigidity.  Institutional  reaons  consisted of  the  costs  associated  with the  production of  new formats,  the  logistics 
problems of their reproduction and distributing them to the hundreds of facilities, some of which were located in 
geographically inacessible regions. The size of the individual forms, some of which even ran up to 100 pages, made 
the task of changing a paper based form extremely daunting. Further, we were constantly reminded that the existing 
forms had only recently been approved by the Central Statistical Authority, and so no further changes could be made 
for at  least 5 years  which corresponded to the national planning cycle.  The technical  reason contributing to the 
rigidity of the form was the very clutterred design which was full of multiple rows and columns. For example, some 
of the forms had about 250 rows and 12 columns, which would have been very difficult to modify in technical terms. 
Bathed in the philosophy of flexible systems and local action, HISP saw forms as something very flexible which 
could be modified at  will based on user needs.  The entire software had been built  on a modular structure,  and 
changes could easily been made at the data entry level without affecting other parts of the system. Furthernore, some 
technical  innovations  were  created  by  the  software  development  team,  specifically  concerning  the  “multi-
dimensional” data element to replace the existing uni-dimensional data element. Through this innovation, previously 
existing multiple uni-dimensional data elements (for example, children in different age categories which would be 
treated as different elements) could now be treated as a single data element (children) having mutliple categories 
(representing age groups). This innovation was further combined with another development of a customized data 
entry screen by which the data entry could be done on the screen which replicated the paper form, as contrasted to 
data entry through a list of data elements organized vertically. The screen shots below illustrate the two systems of 
data entry.  The combination of these two technical innovations provided us with a great deal of flexibility in the 
design of the forms. 
Figure 2: Form 1 customized data entry form, english version
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Figure 3: Form 1 with data elements listed vertically in standard layout
The interplay of these two logics came in when we started to make suggestions in the design of the screens, showing 
how space could be used better, or by making aesthetic based improvements (such as the use of logos and maps). 
However, the argument of no permission for changes was used to shut out our requests. When we started to say that  
we could try out some new designs on an experimental basis and change over easily if it did not work, it was still no 
go.
Interplay of logics and implications for deinstitutionalization  
As Oliver has pointed out that deinstitutionalization arises from pressures relating to social, political and functional. 
These pressures,  if  gaining adequate  momentum can create  a sense of dissensus in the existing institutions and 
provide the impetus for the dissipation or erosion of existing institutions. In the case described, the interplay of the 
institutional  logics  could  demonstrate  a  great  deal  of  functional   dissensus  and  how the  existing  system  was 
operationally inefficient, based on poor quality data and providing data which could not be used. We demonstrated 
this functional deficiencies through out analysis, for example through showing that in some of the forms nearly 90% 
of the data was being reported as zeros or blanks. We also argued that while a huge amount of data was collected, no 
indicators were being used. However, the Ministry of Health just flatly refuted our claim and just said that no data 
was being collected that was not being used as an indicator. When examples were shown by us to the contrary, they 
were just brushed away as being exceptions.
A degree of social pressure had been placed on the MOH to reform their HMIS through efforts of the World Bank 
and ADB that had created specific structures (like the establishment of the HSRP office) for guiding reform efforts. 
However,  since  the  HSRP  was  an  independent  structure,  and  had  a  time  bound  life  (of  3  years),  their 
reccomendations  were  not  binding on the MOH to accept.  However,  on the political  front,  we failed to  create 
adequate momentm and pressure to trigger change.  The political decision making centre was at the MOH who were 
closely aligned with the MedStat, and our influence on that was minimal. Our alignment was with the ADB who 
were primarily considered as a donor (that too in the form of loans), and thus not sifficently powerful to enforce 
change.
In  summary,  it  could  be  seen  that  the  interplay  of  logics  primarily  intersected  on  the  functional  domain,  and 
confronted  with  a  strongly  historically  embedded  system,  could  hardly  make  a  dent  on  the  political  domain. 
However, what we succeeded to do was the creation of some seeds of change, firstly by creating a system that had an 
inscribed flexible logic which could be modifed into a more effective HMIS in the system in the future (when the 
political  conditions would be more favorable).   Another gain could be the fact  through our various reports and 
presentations, we had introduced new discourses into the HMIS reform efforts, such as related to use of information, 
the use of  indicators,  and data quality and validation. So,  while  some seeds  for  deinstitutionalization had been 
planted, adequate political pressure could not be created for deinstitutionalization to take place in practice. This also 
emphasizes, institutional change processes are painfully slow.
7 Conclusions
The  interplay  of  the  two  sets  of  logics  basically  involved  two  different  paradigms  which  at  one  level  were 
irreconciliable and could not coexist. However, we believe that in such a historically embedded system, a paradigm 
shift would only come about if mandated explictly from the top political authority – the health minister. While local 
level incremental efforts may be useful to create some local expertise and knowledge, the lower levels have really no 
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authority or voice to influence change. The strategy of local empowerment which had worked for the HISP project in 
South Africa, was a product of the historical moment that existed, one arising from the breakdown of the apartheid 
system and the political agenda that mandated decentratization and integration.
This study makes some interesting contributions for the IS field. Firstly, it brings into the map a study from a country 
which till date has remained nearly completely invisible to the IS community. Secondly, it contributes to the debate 
about bottom up and top down implementation models by arguing that such decisions are products of historical 
circumstances, and bottom up may not be always most effective even though ideologically appealing. Thirdly, the 
conceptual framework of institutional logics, their interplay, and implications for deinstitutionalization, provides an 
interesting approach to study implementation experiences more broadly, not just HMIS in a post-Soviet republic. In 
other cicumstances, there would be different forms of logics would be in play, and studying them would provide rich 
insights into the implementation dynamics. 
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